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Somalia, Dark Clouds and Silver-lining

by Abukar Arman

The painfully haunting pictures ofseverely malnourished children on the verge of death,transmitted through all forms of media tell a horrific taleof humane misery. The scope and the level of urgency isabundantly clear to all those who have compassionateness and heart.

However, with the darkest clouds hanging over Somaliathere still shines through a silver-lining. Three seeminglyunthinkable developments have already come to pass, withanother is underway. Some of these, ironically, had directroles in creating the current situation.

First,Al-Shabaab started to grant access of the global foodaid, and subsequently pulled their forces out of Mogadishu.Second, the US government decisive to ease at least oneaspect of it is “global war on terror” policies, namelycompliance with the regulatings of OFAC (Office of ForeignAssets Control) which forced a good deal of humanitarian laborers andorganizations to choose the path of the least resistance-stop delivering feed and services to any areas controlled byAl-Shabaab in order to refrain from being accused of aiding andabetting terrorist persons and organization. Third, theTransitional Federal Government (TFG) put the humanitarianissue on the top of it is agenda. And currently, the Somalipeople and organizations in the Diaspora—many withdiverging priorities—have been setting their differencesaside and spontaneously forming coalitions and collaborativeefforts to save lives.

That said; it would be naïve atbest to think that these developments are all that is neededto untangle the web of political, security, and nowhumanitarian challenges that crippled the Somali state forthe past twenty years.

Without dwelling on the blamegame, a good deal of clarification is necessary in order to have theright context and understanding to move forward.

Theculprits ofttimes cited by the media, drought, Al-Shabaab andlack of good governance, are legitimate, but to assert thatthey are the ‘only ones’ is disingenuous, to say theleast. Just like everything else in Somalia, the famine hasinternal and external factors. Routinely, the former get allthe attention; the latter, seldom. For the past severalmonths as the circumstance was speedily worsening, there was afierce inter-agency debate (influenced by sure elementswithin the international community) on whether or not the UNshould announce the condition in Somalia a famine. Even ascertain organizations threatened to go public with theircriticism, the stalemate continued to the last minute beforea consensus was in the long run reached on July 19, 2011.

Inreference to the aforementioned developments, there are manyfactors that compelled Al-Shabaab to take thesecounterintuitive measures.

Al-Shabaab, through theirdraconian rule, has squandered any local help they mayhave gained for the duration of the Ethiopian occupation of 2007-2009 atwhich point they were the fiercest factor within theinsurgency. At the same time, the African Union forces,AMISOM, have not long ago changed their ill-advised scheme ofblind firing of heavy artilleries in response to Al-Shabaabprovocations which routinely caused indiscriminate killingsof largely civilians, and consequently boostingAl-Shabaab’s appeal.

Furthermore, in recent months,Al-Shabaab came under sustained military pressure from theSomali National Army and AMISOM joint operation that provedunbearable. They were drasti loosing momentum and wereat risk of suffering a decisive defeat. Equally important,the government succeeded in flushing out Al-Shabaab’shuman intelligence out of the unregulated national telecomindustry, and disrupted or shutoff their propaganda radiostations. The government likewise opened a safe house and setupa de-radicalization program for defectors of Al-Shabaab thatis proven successful.

Of course, this is not the time tolet guards down. Al-Shabaab’s action could be a tacticalretreat.

The August 6, 2011 Al-Shabaab evacuation out ofMogadishu marked the firstborn time in the past twenty yearsthat Somalia’s capital city has been ruled by a singleauthority; and the TFG is not taking this fact for granted.Already, in collaboration with AMISOM forces, even though hardlywith adequate expedience, the government has been setting upsecurity apparatuses in key areas vacated by Al-Shabaab, andare in the procedure of setting up check points in allstrategic entry points of Mogadishu .

Simultaneously, ina gesture of goodwill, the government has extended “anopen amnesty” to all those Al-Shabaab members more than willing toput down their guns. Furthermore, the government has startedto impose rigorous laws in dealing with those who rob, steal,or misappropriate feed aid. Last week, two soldiers foundguilty of stealing two gallons of cooking oil and a cellphone were sentenced to five years in prison each.

Meanwhile, the US, mindful of the public relationstsunami that could result from it is withholding feed aidcontribution for closely 2 years, started to ease itsrestrictions. Up to 90% of it is donated foods in storagesin the region are being diverted to Somalia. The WhiteHouse, State Department, and USAID have been conveningmeetings and setting up teleconferences to spotlight UScontributions and to give hope or courage to NGOs to accelerate theirdelivery services.

Somali Diaspora community organizers,organizational leaders in respective elements of the US have beenparticipating in these meetings.

One of the mostpersistent worries was the exuberant overhead costs of someof the most well known international NGOs contracted to feedand provide other necessary services to the starvingpeople.

The Somali community has now formed a grassrootsmulti-organizational coalition as a humanitarian taskforce.Their priority is to pull their resources together, to holdjoint fundraising events, and to empower Somaliorganizations that are legally registered in the US thathave tax immune status beneath the IRS 501(c)(3). Many ofthese organizations charge greatest or most complete or best possible of 10% overhead costs tosetup feeding centers in the affected areas. This trend doesnot only have the potential to deliver direly neededservices more expediently, less costly, and more effectivelythan their more bureaucratic and more costly counterparts,but has the potential to pave the way for reconciliation ofthis war-fatigued nation.

Make no mistake; the currentdire circumstance in which Somali children, mothers, and eldersare dying at alarming rates compels individuals, groups andgovernments of goodwill to set their deviations isolated andto work together in palliating the suffering. This is thetime to work together in opening deliverance routes, feedingcenters, and health clinics. This is the time to mobilizeall humane and financial resources to deliver direly neededservices.

However, in order to sustain security and ensurethe safe deliverance of food, marshal global resources,provide the necessary logistics to deliver feed to remoteareas, and to protect these support monies and feed fromexploitation, policy overhaul on the share of TFG, US, andinternational community is a must.

As Al-Shabaab is notmonolithic, the TFG ought to find a way to directly engagethat entity, and to set up a authenti Somali-ownedreconciliation routine free of any alien interference. TheUS, on it is part, ought to exhaustively review and reverse itsDual-Track Policy. The said policy purposely engages anyand all Somali non-state actors and militia groups assovereign states of their own, and as such, is consideredthe undisputed most influential policy that fragmented theSomali state. And lastly, the global community oughtto reconsider it is role as an uncritical facilitator, andsome may argue, implementer of the Dual-Track Policy.

Thecurrent humane catastrophe only highlights the importance ofsupporting the resuscitation procedure of the dying Somalistate.

************* Abukar Arman is Somalia’s Special Envoy tothe United States.